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Abstract
In Android, communications between apps and sys-
tem services are supported by a transaction-based Inter-
Process Communication (IPC) mechanism. Binder, as
the cornerstone of this IPC mechanism, separates two
communicating parties as client and server. As with any
client–server model, the server should not make any as-
sumption on the validity (sanity) of client-side transac-
tion. To our surprise, we find this principle has fre-
quently been overlooked in the implementation of An-
droid system services. In this paper, we demonstrate the
prevalence and severity of this vulnerability surface and
try to answer why developers keep making this seem-
ingly simple mistake. Specifically, we design and im-
plement BinderCracker, an automatic testing framework
that supports parameter-aware fuzzing and has identi-
fied more than 100 vulnerabilities in six major versions
of Android, including the latest version Android 6.0,
Marshmallow. Some of the vulnerabilities have severe
security implications, causing privileged code execution
or permanent Denial-of-Service (DoS). We analyzed the
root causes of these vulnerabilities to find that most of
them exist because system service developers only con-
sidered exploitations via public APIs. We thus highlight
the deficiency of testing only on client-side public APIs
and argue for the necessity of testing and protection on
the Binder interface — the actual security boundary.
Specifically, we discuss the effectiveness and practical-
ity of potential countermeasures, such as precautionary
testing and runtime diagnostic.
1 Introduction
Android is the most popular smartphone OS and dom-
inates the global market with a share of more than
82% [34]. By the end of 2015, the total number of An-
droid devices surpassed 1.4 billion, and there were more
than 1.6 million mobile apps available in Google Play
for download [15, 26]. The developers of these apps are
not always trustworthy; many of them might be inexpe-
rienced, careless or even malicious. Therefore, proper
isolation between apps and the system is essential for ro-
bustness and security.
To meet this requirement, apps in Android execute in
application sandboxes. If an app wants to interact with
system services, it must perform Inter-Process Com-
munications (IPC). Binder, as the cornerstone of this
IPC mechanism, separates two communicating parties as
client and server. Each server (i.e., system service in this
case) exports a list of public APIs that clients (i.e., mo-
bile apps) can invoke. The input parameters of each API
go through extensive sanity checks on the client-side be-
fore being packed into a transaction and then sent to the
server. An AIDL (Android Interface Description Lan-
guage) file further enforces the schema of each transac-
tion, serving as an explicit contract between the client
and the server. These client-side public APIs get exam-
ined and tested by thousands of participating vendors of
AOSP (Android Open Source Project) and are believed
to be robust.
Robust public APIs and AIDL enforcement can pro-
tect system services against erroneous input from care-
less or inexperienced app developers, but render ineffec-
tive against developers with an adversarial mindset. This
is because both enforcements reside in the process space
of the client (attacker) and thus can eventually be circum-
vented. In other words, any system service that hinges
on the validity (sanity) of client-side transaction is fun-
damentally vulnerable — the server should be robust on
its own. This is probably a best engineering practice for
any system that adopts a client–server model, but has sur-
prisingly been overlooked in the implementation of many
Android system services. In this paper, we conduct a
comprehensive study of this attack surface in Android.
Specifically, we answer two important questions:
Q1. How prevalent is this issue in Android, a major open
source project?
Q2. Why are so many developers making this seemingly
simple mistake?
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To answer these questions, we designed and imple-
mented BinderCracker, an automatic testing framework
for Android system services. BinderCracker automat-
ically crawls the RPC interfaces of both Java and na-
tive system services, and injects fuzzing transactions via
the Binder surface. This directly challenges the robust-
ness of the error-handling mechanisms in the system ser-
vices. To increase the scale and depth of our testing,
BinderCracker supports parameter-aware fuzzing with
semi-valid inputs. This requires us to record and mu-
tate existing transactions and understand their semantics.
Doing this in the context of Android is challenging be-
cause a transaction may contain remote object handles
that cannot be recorded in the form of raw bytes. More-
over, transactions frequently contain dynamic and non-
primitive data types that are difficult to mutate in a sensi-
ble way. BinderCracker overcomes these challenges by
implementing a replay engine that has in-depth under-
standing of Binder transactions. It utilizes the depen-
dencies between transactions to reconstruct remote ob-
ject handles during runtime, and tracks the hierarchy of
non-primitive data types to unmarshall them into primi-
tive types.
We examined more than 2400 service APIs in 6 ma-
jor versions of Android, including the latest Android 6.0
(Marshmallow). In total, we identified more than 100
vulnerabilities, most of which are unfixed to date. Many
of the vulnerabilities we identified are found to be able to
crash the entire Android Runtime, while others can cause
specific system services or system apps to fail. Some vul-
nerabilities have severe security implications, and may
result in system memory corruption, privileged code ex-
ecution, targeted or permanent Denial-of-Service (DoS).
This extensive testing also demonstrates the effectiveness
of our parameter-aware fuzzing — it identified 7x more
vulnerabilities than simple black-box fuzzing with the
same amount of time. Furthermore, since BinderCracker
is parameter-aware, we can now unearth different vul-
nerabilities in the same RPC method by fuzzing different
parameters in the same transaction.
We further analyzed the root causes of the identi-
fied vulnerabilities and studied 117 of them in Android
source codes. Most of them exist because the develop-
ers only considered exploitations of public APIs. There-
fore, many risky scenarios are assumed to be ‘unlikely’
or even ‘impossible’ in their mindset. Here, we list three
most common mistakes made by system service devel-
opers that contribute to a vast majority of the vulnera-
bilities. First, private APIs are assumed to be unknown
to others, thus no sanity-check is made. Second, client-
side enforcements are assumed to be secure, so there is
no double check of them at the server-side. Third, the
de-serialization process is assumed to be always undis-
turbed, hence no sanity check is conducted during this
process. All of these are unreliable assumptions because
they either directly or indirectly depend on the validity of
client-side transactions. Moreover, we demonstrate most
of the vulnerabilities can never be found by testing only
public APIs. We, therefore, highlight the deficiency of
testing only client-side public APIs and argue for the ne-
cessity of testing and protection at the Binder surface —
the actual security boundary.
As our findings indicate, new vulnerabilities keep on
emerging, especially with releases of new Android ver-
sions. To address this emerging attack surface, we need
to eliminate potential vulnerabilities as early as possible
in the development cycle. Specifically, we suggest the
use of various precautionary testing techniques (includ-
ing BinderCracker) before each product release. This
can stop a large number of vulnerabilities from reach-
ing the end-users. In fact, many severe vulnerabilities [6,
7, 27] could have been avoided, had BinderCracker been
deployed. We also describe how to enhance the visibility
of Binder transaction during runtime to support more
informative runtime diagnosis, in case some vulnerabili-
ties leak through BinderCracker and eventually reach the
end-users.
This paper makes five main contributions by:
• Conducting the first comprehensive study that as-
sesses the robustness of Android system services
and unveiling an alarming perspective.
• Designing and implementing BinderCracker, an au-
tomatic testing framework that supports parameter-
aware fuzzing on the Binder surface;
• Conducting an extensive test on 6 major Android
versions and identifying 100+ vulnerabilities, some
of which have severe security implications;
• Unearthing the root causes of these vulnerabili-
ties and highlighting the necessity of protection on
Binder — the actual security boundary;
• Discussing the effectiveness and practicality of po-
tential countermeasures, such as precautionary test-
ing and runtime diagnostic techniques.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes related work in the field of software testing
and Android security. Section 3 introduces Binder and
AIDL in Android, and describes how Android uses these
to build system services. Section 4 examines the attack
surface under our investigation. Section 5 details the de-
sign and implementation of an automatic testing frame-
work, BinderCracker, which exposes vulnerable system
services. Section 6 describes our tests on stock Android
firmware and analyzes the root causes and security impli-
cations of the discovered vulnerabilities. Section 7 gives
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a comprehensive discussion on how to effectively elimi-
nate these vulnerabilities in the development cycle. Sec-
tion 8 discusses the long-term value and other potential
uses of our work, and finally, the paper concludes with
Section 9.
2 Related Work
Discussed below is related work in the field of software
testing and Android security.
Software Testing. In the software community, robust-
ness testing falls into two categories: functional and ex-
ceptional testing. Functional testing focuses on verifying
the functionality of software using expected input, while
exceptional testing tries to apply unexpected and faulty
inputs to crash the system. Numerous efforts have been
made in the software testing community to test the ro-
bustness of Android [1, 2, 17, 21, 24, 36]. Most of them
focus on the functional testing of GUI elements [1, 2, 17,
21]. Some have conducted exceptional testing on the
evolving public APIs [24]. In this paper, we highlight
the deficiency of testing only on public APIs and con-
duct an exceptional testing on lower-level Binder-based
RPC interfaces.
Android Security. Android has received significant at-
tention from the research community as an open source
operating system [4, 10, 11, 16, 23, 28, 32]. Existing An-
droid security studies largely focus on the imperfection
of high-level permission model [12, 13, 25], and the re-
sulting issues, such as information leakage [10], priv-
ilege escalation [4, 28] and collusion [23]. Our work
highlights the insufficient protection of Android’s lower-
level Binder-based RPC mechanism and how it affects
the robustness of system services.
There also exist a few studies focusing on the IPC
mechanism of Android [5, 9, 19, 22, 29]. However, they
largely focus on one specific instance of Android IPC
— Intent. Since the senders and recipients of In-
tents are both apps, manipulating Intents will not serve
the purpose of exposing vulnerabilities in system ser-
vices. Some researchers also provide recommendations
for hardening Android IPCs [19, 22] and point out that
the key issue in Intent communication is the lack of for-
mal schema. We demonstrate that even for mechanisms
enforcing a formal schema, such as AIDL, robustness re-
mains as a critical issue. Gong et al. [14] also conducted
experiments on the fuzzing of Binder interface. How-
ever, they focused on implementing Proof-of-Concept
(PoC) exploits using identified vulnerabilities, instead
of comprehensively assessing and understanding the at-
tack surface. In fact, they only tested simple black-box
fuzzing on one Android version, which is a small sub-
set of our work. We regard their work as a parallel and
independent effort from an industry perspective.
3 Android IPC and Binder
Android executes apps and system services as different
processes and enforces isolation between them. To en-
able different processes to exchange information with
each other, Android provides, Binder, a secure and ex-
tensible IPC mechanism. Described below are the basic
concepts in the Binder framework and an explanation
of how a typical system service is built using these basic
primitives.
3.1 Binder
In Android, Binder provides a message-based commu-
nication channel between two processes. It consists of (i)
a kernel-level driver that achieves communication across
process boundaries, (ii) a Binder library that uses ioctl
syscall to talk with the kernel-level driver, and (iii) upper-
level abstracts that utilize the Binder library. Conceptu-
ally, Binder takes a classical client–server architecture.
A client can send a transaction to the remote server via
the Binder framework and then retrieves its response.
The parameters of the transaction are marshalled into a
Parcel object which is a serializable data container. The
Parcel object is sent through the Binder driver and then
gets delivered to the server. The server de-serializes the
parameters of the Parcel object, processes the transac-
tion, and returns a response in a similar way back to the
client. This allows a client to achieve Remote Procedure
Call (RPC) and invoke methods on remote servers as if
they were local. This Binder-based RPC is one of the
most frequent forms of IPC in Android, and underpins
the implementation of most system services.
3.2 AIDL
Many RPC systems use IDL (Interface Description Lan-
guage) to define and restrict the format of a remote in-
vocation [22], and so does Android. The AIDL (Android
Interface Description Language) file allows the devel-
oper to define the RPC interface both the client and the
server agree upon [3]. Android can automatically gener-
ate Stub and Proxy classes from an AIDL file and relieve
the developers from (re-)implementing the low-level de-
tails to cope with native Binder libraries. The auto-
generated Stub and Proxy classes will ensure that the de-
clared list of parameters will be properly serialized, sent,
received, and de-serialized. The developer only needs
to provide a .aidl file and implement the correspond-
ing interface. In other words, the AIDL file serves as an
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interface IQueueService {
boolean add(String name);
String peek();
String poll();
String remove ();
}
Figure 1: An example AIDL file which defines the inter-
face of a service that implements a queue.
explicit contract between client and server. This enforce-
ment makes the Binder framework extensible, usable,
and robust. Fig. 1 shows an example AIDL file that de-
fines the interface of a service that implements a queue.
3.3 System Service
We now describe how the low-level concepts in the
Binder framework are structured to deliver a sys-
tem service, using Wi-Fi service as an example. To
implement the Wi-Fi service, system developers only
need to define its interfaces as an AIDL description,
and then implement the corresponding server-side logic
(WifiService) and client-side wrapper (WifiManager)
(see Fig. 2). The serialization, transmission, and de-
serialization of the interface parameters are handled by
the codes automatically generated from the AIDL file.
Specifically, when the client invokes some RPC method
in the client-side wrapper WifiManager, the Proxy class
IWifiManager.Stub.Proxywill marshall the input pa-
rameters in a Parcel object and send it across the pro-
cess boundary via the Binder driver. The Binder li-
brary at the server-side will then unmarshall the param-
eters and invoke the onTransact function in the Stub
class IWifiManager.Stub. This eventually invokes the
service logic programmed in WifiService. Fig. 2 pro-
vides a clear illustration of the entire process.
4 The Attack Surface
The Binder framework separates two communicating
parties as client and server. In the most common sce-
nario, the client is a user-level app and the server is a
system service. As with any client–server model, the
server should never trust the client. In the particular case
of Android which uses the Binder framework to build a
light-weight RPC mechanism, the following two impor-
tant properties have to be guaranteed.
• The RPC interfaces in both client and server sides
should be consistent: they should expect the same
list of input and return parameters.
Figure 2: How does an app communicate with a system ser-
vice using Binder-based RPC (using Wi-Fi service as an ex-
ample)? The red shaded region represents the codes that need
to be provided/implemented by the service developer.
• Each parameter of the RPC interface should be
properly checked: the server should only accept a
transaction if all of its parameters are valid.
To guarantee these properties, Android adopts an
AIDL enforcement and conducts extensive testings on
public APIs. AIDL serves as an explicit contract between
the server and the client. It defines the RPC interfaces a
service trying to provide. A system service developer
can work on top of an AIDL interface and leave the seri-
alization, transmission and de-serialization to be handled
automatically by the codes generated from the AIDL file.
Bugs in the codes that are manually written by the devel-
oper are eliminated further by testing on public APIs and
feedbacks from thousands of vendors and hundreds of
millions of users. Thanks to these mechanisms, Android
services, especially the widely-used and well-maintained
system services, could be made robust.
However, when the client is malicious and trying
to sabotage system services intentionally, these mecha-
nisms cannot be counted on as a secure measure. This
is because both enforcements reside in the process space
of the client (attacker), thus can eventually be circum-
vented. Specifically, although AIDL enforcement and
public API testing consolidate the upper and middle lay-
ers of the program stack, the service APIs (RPC inter-
faces) are still directly exposed in the low-layer of the
stack — the Binder driver. By directly injecting faulty
transactions into the Binder driver, an attacker can cir-
cumvent these existing protections in the upper layers
and directly confront the server-side exception handling
mechanisms. Fig. 3 gives an illustrative view of this at-
tack surface.
Ideally, this should not affect the robustness of system
services. The server-side codes should be robust on its
own without making any assumption on the client-side
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Figure 3: By injecting faulty transactions via the Binder
driver, an attacker can bypass the protections in the upper lay-
ers of the program stack, and directly confront the server-side
exception handling mechanisms.
transactions. This is probably a best engineering prac-
tice for any system that adopts a client–server model.
However, we found this principle frequently overlooked
in the implementation of Android system services, thus
motivating us to perform a comprehensive study of this
attack surface. Specifically, we want to answer two ques-
tions: (1) how prevalent is this issue in Android, a major
open source project? and (2) why are so many develop-
ers making this seemingly simple mistake?
4.1 Attack Model
In this paper, we assume the adversary is a malicious app
developer trying to sabotage system services. The ad-
versary may mount this attack for various malicious pur-
poses, such as launching a Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tack, achieving privileged code execution, etc. A system
service can be generic, existing in Android framework
base, or vendor-specific, introduced by device manufac-
turers. The attacker has no root permission and cannot
penetrate the security of OS kernel.
5 Automatic Vulnerability Discovery
To answer the questions raised above, we design and im-
plement an automatic testing framework, BinderCracker,
that can effectively unearth vulnerabilities in system ser-
vices. To the best of our knowledge, BinderCracker is
the first tool that supports parameter-aware fuzzing on
the Binder surface.
struct binder_transaction_data {
union {
size_t handle ; // (1) .target service
void *ptr ;
}target ;
void *cookie ;
unsigned int code; // (2) .RPC method
unsigned int flags;
pid_t sender_pid ;
uid_t sender_euid ;
size_t data_size ;
size_t offsets_size;
union {
struct {
binder_uintptr_t buffer ;
binder_uintptr_t offsets ;
} ptr;
__u8 buf [8];
} data; // (3) . transactional data
};
Figure 4: The data struct sent through the Binder diver via
the ioctl libc call. This struct contains three important pieces
of information we need to modify to send a fuzzing transaction.
5.1 BinderCracker: An Overview
To fuzz a system service, BinderCracker must be able to
send mal-formatted transactions to it. The attack surface
we use is fundamental — the client can send any arbi-
trary transaction to the server because the client has com-
plete control over its own process space, and can thus by-
pass any client-side enforcement. This can be achieved
by either taking advantage of hidden Android APIs or hi-
jacking the libc call that underpins the Binder communi-
cation library. Both of these techniques can be achieved
in user-level without extending the Android system [35].
Basically, BinderCracker is manipulating (either directly
or indirectly) a binder transaction data struct sent
to the Binder driver. This data struct contains three im-
portant pieces of information we need to modify to send a
fuzzing transaction and has the format as shown in Fig. 4.
The target.handle field specifies the service this
transaction is sent to. The code field represents a specific
RPC method we want to fuzz. The data struct contains
the serialized bytes of the list of parameters for the RPC
method, which is inherently a Parcel object. Parcel is
a container class that provides a convenient set of seri-
alization and de-serialization methods for different data
types. Both the client and the server work directly with
this Parcel object to send and receive the input param-
eters. Later in this section, we will elaborate on how to
modify the handle and code variables to redirect the
transaction to a specific RPC method of a specified ser-
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vice, and how to fuzz the Parcel object to facilitate test-
ing with different policies.
5.2 Transaction Redirection
There is a one-to-one mapping from the handle vari-
able in the binder transaction data object to sys-
tem service. This mapping is created during runtime
and maintained by the Binder driver. Since the client
has no control over the Binder driver, it cannot get
this mapping directly. For system services that are stat-
ically cached, we can get them indirectly by querying
a static service manager which has a fixed handle of
0. This service manager is a centralized controller for
service registry and will be started before any other ser-
vices. By sending a service interface descriptor (such
as android.os.IWindowManager) to the service manager,
it will return an IBinder object which contains the
handle for the specified service. For system services
that are dynamically allocated, we can retrieve them
by recursively replaying the supporting transactions that
generate these services. We will elaborate this later when
discussing transaction fuzzing.
After getting the handle of a system service, we
need to further specify the code variable in the
binder transaction data object. Each code repre-
sents a different RPC method defined in the AIDL file.
This mapping can be found in the Stub files which are
automatically generated from the AIDL file. The code
variable typically ranges from 1 to the total number of
methods declared in the AIDL file. For native system
services that are not implemented in Java, this mapping
is directly coded in either the source files or the header
files. Therefore, we scan both the AIDL files and the na-
tive source codes of Android to construct the mapping
between transaction codes and RPC methods.
5.3 Transaction Fuzzing
After being able to redirect a Binder transaction to a
chosen RPC method of a chosen system service, the
next step is to manipulate the transaction data and create
faulty transactions that are unlikely to occur in normal
circumstances. Here, we take three widely-used fuzzing
policies: sending empty transaction, random transac-
tions, and semi-valid transactions. The first two poli-
cies are easy to implement because it is agnostic of the
RPC method we target — we only need to fill the trans-
action with either NULL values or randomly generated
bytes. The last policy, however, requires us to under-
stand the semantics of a transaction to fuzz each param-
eter individually. Next, we explain how BinderCracker
supports parameter-aware fuzzing with semi-valid trans-
actions and why it is challenging even when we already
Figure 5: When fuzzing a transaction, we need to replay the
supporting transactions according to their relative order in the
dependency graph. This way, all the remote objects this trans-
action requires will be reconstructed during runtime.
know the RPC interfaces.
Parameter-Aware Fuzzing. To increase the scale and
depth of testing, BinderCracker supports fuzzing with
semi-valid transactions. A transaction is said to be semi-
valid if all of the parameters it contains are valid ex-
cept for one. Semi-valid transactions can dive deeper
into the program structure without being early rejected,
thus is able to reveal more in-depth vulnerabilities. To
test with semi-valid transactions, we need to first record
valid (seed) transactions, and then mutate the parame-
ters in each transaction. This requires BinderCracker
to be parameter-aware and is challenging for two rea-
sons. First, recording a transaction is challenging when
the transaction involves remote objects that cannot be
recorded as raw bytes. In this scenario, values in the
raw bytes are merely handles to the remote objects and
become meaningless once out of the current execution
context. Second, mutating a transaction is challenging
when the transaction contains dynamic or non-primitive
data types. Since the internal structure of this data type
is unknown, we do not know how to mutate it in a sensi-
ble way. For example, many RPC interfaces take Intent
as an input parameter. As a non-primitive data type, an
Intent may contain arbitrary types of primitive types
(i.e., Int, String, Double), depending on what has
been put into it during runtime. Next, we will detail how
we overcome these technical challenges.
Remote Object. In Android, more than 14% of RPC
methods and 37% of user-level RPC calls involve a re-
mote object. The most frequent form of a remote object
is an IBinder object, which is widely-used for register-
ing and invoking remote callbacks. Recording the raw
bytes of these objects won’t work since they are merely
object handles. We overcome this challenge by main-
taining a dependency graph among transactions. When
recording each transaction, we iterate through the list of
remote objects it takes as input and generates as output.
Then, we construct a dependency graph that records how
dynamic IBinders are produced and consumed. Be-
fore trying to replay a transaction, we need to execute
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Figure 6: The internal type structure of a non-primitive data type, Intent, generated by recording the de-serialization process
of each non-primitive type. Note that this type structure is dynamic — it depends on what has been put into this Intent during
runtime.
Figure 7: How does BinderCracker generate semi-valid
fuzzing transactions from seed transactions.
the supporting transactions according to their relative or-
der in the dependency graph (see Fig. 5). This way, all
the remote objects this transaction requires will be recon-
structed and cached beforehand. A similar technique is
also used to generate the handle of dynamically gener-
ated system services.
Non-primitive Data Types. In Android, more than
48% of the RPC methods involve non-primitive data
types. Since we do not know their internal type struc-
tures, we cannot effectively fuzz it. We solve this prob-
lem by instrumenting the (de-)serialization functions in
the Parcel class. During the recording process of the
seed transaction, when the client de-serializes each input
parameter from the Parcel object (the transaction), we
also record its hierarchical meta-data by recording the
orders of the function invocations. This way, we know
how to unmarshall every non-primitive data types and
can decompose a seed transaction into an array of prim-
itive types. We then iterate through this list and mutate
each unmarshalled primitive types. For numerical types
such as Integer, we may add or substrate a small delta
from the current value or change it to Integer.MAX, 0 or
Integer.MIN; for literal types such as String, we may ran-
domly mutate the bytes contained in the String or insert
special characters at certain locations. Fig. 6 illustrates
the internal type structure of a non-primitive data type,
Intent, generated by recording its de-serialization pro-
cess.
In summary, BinderCracker maintains both the type
hierarchy and dependency graph when recording a seed
transaction. These information capture the semantic and
context of each transaction and help BinderCracker gen-
erate semi-valid fuzzing transactions. Specifically, it fol-
lows the process illustrated in Fig. 7. For each seed trans-
action we want to fuzz, we first parse the raw bytes of
the transaction and unmarshall non-primitive data types
into an array of primitive types (step 1). This utilizes the
type hierarchy recorded with the seed transaction. Then,
we check the dependency of the transaction (step 2) and
retrieve all the supporting transactions (steps 3, 4). This
step utilizes the dependency graph recorded with the seed
transaction. After that, we need to replay the supporting
transactions (step 5) to generate and cache the remote
IBinder object handles (steps 6, 7). Finally, the fuzzer
can start to generate semi-valid fuzzing transactions by
mutating each parameter in the seed transaction (steps 8,
9).
5.4 Server Exceptions
After sending a faulty transaction to a remote service,
there are a few possible responses from the server-side.
First, the server detects the input is invalid and rejects the
transaction, writing an IllegalArgumentException
message back to the client. Second, the server accepts
the argument and starts the transaction, but encounters
unexpected states or behaviors and catches some type
of RuntimeException. Third, the server doesn’t catch
some bizarre scenarios, causes a Fatal Exception and
crashes itself. In this paper, we focus on the last type
of responses, as it is most critical and has disastrous con-
sequences.
Depending on the implementation of the system ser-
vice, the exception can be in the Java layer or in the
native codes. A complete crash report consists of error
messages, recorded states of the registers, stack traces
and a memory dump. This information, especially the
stack traces, is helpful for locating the bugs in the source
codes.
6 Testing Results and Analysis
Our automatic testing tool, BinderCracker, is used to
test and identify vulnerable Android system services.
We summarize the vulnerabilities identified across mul-
tiple Android versions, explain their security implica-
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Version API Market Device Build #
4.1.1 16 9.0% Galaxy Note 2 JRO03C
4.2.2 17 12.2% Galaxy S4 JDQ39
4.4.2 19 36.1% Galaxy S4 KOT49H
5.0.1 21 16.9% Nexus 5 LRX22C
5.1.0 22 15.7% Nexus 5 LMY47I
6.0.0 23 0.7% Nexus 5 MRA58K
Figure 8: The list of Android versions we tested using Binder-
Cracker.
tions, and analyze how they survived a major open-
source project like Android.
6.1 Setups
We tested 6 major versions of Android: 4.1 (Jelly-
Bean), 4.2 (JellyBean), 4.4 (KitKat), 5.0 (Lollipop),
5.1 (Lollipop) and 6.0 (Marshmallow). All our exper-
iments are conducted by running BinderCracker on of-
ficial firmwares from major device manufacturers. An
official firmware went through extensive testing by the
vendors and is believed to be ready for a public release.
Each firmware is tested in the initial state, right after it is
installed. We didn’t install any third-party app or change
any configuration except for turning on the adb debug-
ging option, ruling out the influence of external factors.
Fig. 8 lists the detailed information of all the firmwares
we tested.
An RPC method is found to be vulnerable if testing it
resulted in a fatal exception, crashing part of, or the en-
tire Android Runtime. Each unique crash report (stack
traces) under an RPC interface is further referred to as an
individual vulnerability. For each vulnerability reported
here, we followed the process of: 1) identify it on an offi-
cial ROM, 2) manually confirm that it can be reproduced,
and 3) inspect the source codes for a root cause analysis.
For vendor-specific vulnerabilities of which source codes
are not available, such as many of the customized system
services provided by Samsung, we only record the stack
trace.
6.2 Black-box Fuzzing Results
We conducted a comprehensive black-box fuzzing test
on 6 major versions of Android. Specifically, we exam-
ined more than 98 generic system services (by Google)
and 72 vendor-specific services (by Samsung), which
covers more than 2400 low-level RPC methods. For each
method, we sent either an empty transaction or a transac-
tion filled with random bytes. In total, we identified 54
vulnerabilities, 39 of which are found in generic system
services, and 15 are found in vendor-specific services.
Level Exception Type Count
Java
NullPointerException 13
StackOverflowError 4
UnsatisfiedLinkError 2
ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException 2
OutOfResourcesException 1
OutOfMemoryError 1
StringIndexOutOfBoundsException 1
IOException 1
Native
SEGV MAPPER 26
SI TKILL 2
SEGV ACCERR 1
Figure 9: List of exceptions occurred in a comprehensive
black-box fuzzing test.
On average, each version of Android we tested contains
15 vulnerabilities. The latest version of Android (6.0)
still contains 5 vulnerabilities, 2 of which are new. 8
out of the 54 vulnerabilities can crash the entire Android
Runtime (system servers), 13 can crash media servers,
and 13 can cause crash of other system services and apps.
Most of the identified bugs are due to accessing invalid
memory addresses. We also found other causes of a crash
such as StackOverflow. Fig. 9 list all the exception types
and the number of their occurrences discovered in our
test.
Note that new vulnerabilities have been kept emerg-
ing on this attack surface whenever there is a major up-
grade of Android version. We also noticed almost all of
the vulnerabilities are found within the first few fuzzing
transactions, which means that a longer fuzzing time did
not lead to the discovery of new bugs. This suggests the
inefficiency of black-box fuzzing, probably due to the
extremely large fuzzing space. As we will show later,
more vulnerabilities are expected if more semantically-
rich fuzzing techniques are used.
6.3 Parameter-aware Fuzzing Results
To increase the effectiveness of our testing, Binder-
Cracker supports parameter-ware fuzzing with semi-
valid transactions. Generating semi-valid transactions
requires recording and mutating of existing valid trans-
actions. Here, we collected more than one million valid
transactions by running 30 popular apps in two latest An-
droid versions (Android 5.1 and Android 6.0). Based on
this seed dataset, we performed a semi-valid fuzzing test
on more than 445 RPC methods of 78 system services.
Note that we only tested the RPC methods that appeared
in our seed dataset, which is a subset of all available RPC
methods. To increase the coverage of the seed dataset,
one can increase the duration of data collection or incor-
porate other data sources, such as the unit test cases for
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each system service.
We found that semi-valid fuzzing can significantly in-
crease the scale and the depth of our testing. In total, we
identified 89 vulnerabilities in Android 5.1 and Android
6.0 which is 7x more than simple fuzzing. Compared
to the vulnerabilities identified using simple fuzzing,
the vulnerabilities exposed by semi-valid fuzzing are
more interesting and have severer security implications
(to be discussed later). Moreover, since semi-valid
fuzzing is parameter-aware, we can expose different vul-
nerabilities in the same RPC method by fuzzing dif-
ferent parameters in the same API. For example, by
fuzzing different variables contained in the Intent pa-
rameter, BinderCracker identified more than 20 vulner-
abilities in a single RPC method startActivity in
ActivityManagerService. Semi-valid testing also fa-
cilitates the process of identifying the corresponding bug
in the source codes since we now know which input pa-
rameter results in the crash. Later, we will summarize
the root causes of all identified vulnerabilities (in both
simple and semi-valid fuzzing).
6.4 Root Cause Analysis
The direct causes of crashes are uncaught exceptions
such as NullPointerException or SEGV MAPPER, but
the fundamental cause behind them is deeper. For each
crashed system service of which source codes are avail-
able, we looked into the source codes and analyzed the
root causes of the vulnerabilities. Specifically, we are in-
terested in why these vulnerabilities survived in a major
open source project like Android. In summary, we found
that most of the vulnerabilities we identified are very
likely to have been overlooked by system service devel-
opers. A likely explanation is many system developers
only considered exploitation of public APIs, thus directly
injecting faulty transactions to the Binder driver creates
many scenarios that are believed to be ‘unlikely’ or ‘im-
possible’ in their mindset. Here, we highlight some of
the new attack vectors identified by our approach which
contribute to most of the vulnerabilities we identified.
First, an attacker can manipulate RPC parameters
even if they are not directly exposed via public APIs.
For example, IAudioFlinger provides an RPC method
REGISTER CLIENT. This method is only implicitly
called in the Android middleware and is never exposed
via public interfaces. Therefore, the developers of this
system service may not expect an arbitrary input from
this RPC method and didn’t perform a proper check of
the input parameters. In our test, sending a list of null
parameters via the Binder driver can easily crash this
service. This suggests that developers should not over-
look RPC interfaces that are private or hidden.
Second, an attacker can bypass sanity checks around
android .widget . RemoteViews
private RemoteViews (Parcel parcel ,
BitmapCache bitmapCache ) {
int mode = parcel .readInt ();
...
if (mode == MODE_NORMAL ) {
...
} else {
// recursively calls itself
mL = new RemoteViews (parcel ,
mBitmapCache);
// recursively calls itself
mP = new RemoteViews (parcel ,
mBitmapCache);
...
}
...
}
Figure 10: The constructor of the RemoteView class con-
tains a loophole which can cause a StackOverflow exception.
Specifically, a bad recursion will occur if the input Parcel object
follows a certain pattern.
the public API, no matter how comprehensive they are.
For example, the IBluetooth service provides a method
called registerAppConfiguration. All of the pa-
rameters of this RPC method are directly exposed via a
public API and there are multiple layers of sanity check
around this interface. Therefore, if there is an erroneous
input from the public API, the client will throw an ex-
ception and crash without even sending the transaction to
the server side. However, using our approach, an attack
transaction is directly injected to the Binder driver with-
out even going through these client-side checks. This
suggests that the server should always double-check in-
put parameters on its own.
Third, an attacker can exploit the serialization pro-
cess of certain data types and create inputs that are haz-
ardous at the server side. For example, RemoteView is a
Parcelable object that represents a group of hierarchical
views. It contains a loophole in its de-serialization mod-
ule which can cause a StackOverflow exception. As
shown in Fig. 10, a bad recursion will occur if the input
Parcel object follows a certain pattern. By directly ma-
nipulating the serialized bytes of the Parcel sent via the
Binder driver, this loophole can be triggered and crash
the server. This suggests that RPC methods with serial-
izable inputs require special attention and sanity check is
also essential in the de-serializaiton process.
9
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
wallpaper.livepicker
system_server
surfaceflinger
settings
rild quicksearchbox
process.media
phone
packageinstaller
nfc musicfx
music
mms
mediaserver
media
launcher3:wallpaper_chooser
launcher3
inputmethod.latin
gallery3d
email
documentsui
dialer
contacts
camera2
bintvoutservice
android:ui
SystemUI
GoogleApps
DrmServer
# 
of
 V
ul
ne
ra
bi
liti
es
Figure 11: Many of the vulnerabilities we identified are found to be able to crash the entire Android Runtime (system server),
while others can cause specific system services (mediaserver) or system apps (nfc, contacts, etc) to fail.
In summary, most of the vulnerabilities originate from
unreliable assumptions on the transactions from the
client-side. This suggests that there is a misconception
of where the security boundary is for Android system
services — while many may assume the security bound-
ary is at the client-side public APIs, the actual secu-
rity boundary can only stand behind the Binder driver.
Therefore, we advocate the importance of pure server-
side error handling, and highlight the necessity of direct
Binder-level testing on RPC interfaces of remote ser-
vices.
6.5 Security Implications
Most of the vulnerabilities we discovered can be used to
launch a Denial-Of-Service (DoS) attack. Some of them
are found to be able to crash the entire Android Runtime,
while others can cause specific system services or sys-
tem apps to fail. Fig. 11 shows the distribution of the
affected services (apps). When launching a DoS attack,
the attacker can trigger a crash either consistently or only
under certain conditions, for example, when a competi-
tor’s app is running. This can create the impression that
the competitor’s app is buggy and unusable. We even
identified multiple vulnerabilities (in the de-serialization
process of Intent) that can cause targeted crash of al-
most any system/user-level apps, without crashing the
entire system. Specifically, an attacker can craft an Intent
that contains a mal-formated Bundle object and send to
the target app. This will cause a crash during the de-
serialization process of the Intent object before the tar-
get app can conduct any sanity check. Moreover, it can
be very challenging to identify the attacker app under
these scenarios because the OS only knows which ser-
vice/app is broken, but cannot tell who crashed it. We
will discuss more about the attack attribution process in
the next section.
Some of the vulnerabilities we discovered can cause
more serious security problems. We found that in sev-
eral RPC methods, the server-side fails to check po-
tential Integer overflows. This may lead to disastrous
consequences when exploited by an experience attacker.
For example, in IGraphicBufferProducer an Integer
overflow exists such that when a new NativeHandle is
created, the server will malloc smaller memory than it ac-
tually requested (see Fig. 12). Subsequent writes to this
data struct will corrupt the heap on the server-side. This
vulnerability has been demonstrated to be able to achieve
privileged code execution, and insert any arbitrary code
into system server [6]. We also found a vulnerabil-
ity in IContentService that can lead to a infinite boot-
loop, which can only be resolved by factory recovery or
flushing a new ROM. This is also classified as High risk
according to the official specification of Android severity
levels [30].
Besides RPC methods that are not well-implemented,
we also discovered RPC methods that are not properly
protected by existing Permission models. In official
ROMs of Samsung Galaxy 4 (Android 4.2.2 and Android
4.4.2), an attacker can reboot the device by directly send-
ing a transaction to PackageManagerService via the
Binder driver without requiring the REBOOT permis-
sion. This is critical since REBOOT is a sensitive per-
mission only granted to system apps. The other service
is ICoverManager, a customized service from Sam-
sung. An attacker can invoke a certain RPC method of
ICoverManager and block the entire screen with a pop-
up blank Activity. The blank Activity cannot be revoked
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native_handle_t* native_handle_create(int
numFds , int numInts )
{
// numFds & numInts are not checked !
native_handle_t* h = malloc ( ...
+ sizeof (int )*(numFds +numInts ));
h-> version = sizeof ( native_handle_t);
h->numFds = numFds ;
h-> numInts = numInts ;
return h;
}
Figure 12: The constructor of the native handle has an In-
teger Overflow vulnerability that can cause a heap corruption
on the server-side. This can lead to privileged code execution
in system server.
using any virtual or physical button and the only exit is
restarting the device.
6.6 Vulnerabilities: Fixed and Unfixed
We examine how many of the vulnerabilities remain un-
fixed and are potentially zero-day when they are found.
Our analysis is based on the public changes of the source
codes across different Android versions and revisions.
We skip the 15 vulnerabilities in vendor-specific system
services and 7 in generic system services due to the un-
availability of source codes. Note that not all generic
system services are open source, especially when it is re-
lated to decryption/encryption or interactions with OEM
hardware.
Of the 117 analyzed vulnerabilities in Android code
bases, only 18 have been fixed by adding additional san-
ity checks of input parameters. Another 12 vulnera-
bilities ‘disappeared’ during several major Android ver-
sion upgrades either because 1) the corresponding source
codes (or API) have been deleted; or 2) new updates in
other parts of the source codes accidentally bypass the
vulnerable source codes. For example, some crashes are
caused by a recursive call in the RemoteView class (see
Fig. 10). Similar crashes disappeared after Android 5.0.
We looked in the source codes and found this is not be-
cause the bug has been fixed, but because in new versions
of Android a faulty transaction will create an additional
Exception before it reaches the vulnerable codes. The
additional Exception is properly caught and accidentally
avoids the fatal crash caused by the real vulnerability.
We do not consider this as a ‘fix’ since an attacker can
still recreate the crash by manually crafting a transaction
which bypass the new code updates. As of this writing,
Figure 13: Number of the vulnerabilities that are fixed, disap-
peared and unfixed.
there are still 87 vulnerabilities left unfixed. Fig. 13 il-
lustrates the proportion of vulnerabilities that are fixed,
disappeared and unfixed. We have already submitted all
unfixed vulnerabilities to AOSP by the time of this sub-
mission.
7 Defenses
As our testing results demonstrated, new vulnerabilities
emerge whenever there is a major upgrade of the Android
code base. This is because, considering the code size of
Android, it is almost impossible to prevent the develop-
ers from writing buggy codes. Therefore, the only solu-
tion is to eliminate potential bugs as early as possible in
the development cycle. To this end, we discuss potential
defense mechanisms and summarize them into two cat-
egories: (1) precautionary testing, exposing vulnerabili-
ties before releasing the new ROM; (2) runtime defense,
defending against potential bugs after the ROM has been
deployed. Next, we will go through several potential de-
fense mechanisms in each category and discuss whether
it is applicable or practical for our problem. Then, we
demonstrate how to enhance the visibility of ongoing at-
tacks by enabling runtime diagnostic of Binder transac-
tions.
7.1 Precautionary Testing
Before releasing a new ROM, developers can conduct
precautionary testing. The defense can be done early, in
the development phase of each system service, or later,
after the entire ROM gets built.
Android has already adopted a static code analysis
tool, lint, to check potential bugs and optimizations
for correctness, security, performance, usability, acces-
sibility and internationalization [18]. Specifically, lint
provides a feature that supports inspection with annota-
tions. This allows the developer to add metadata tags
to variables, parameters and return values. For ex-
ample, the developer can mark an input parameter as
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@NonNull, indicating that it cannot be Null, or mark it
as @IntRange(from=0,to=255), enforcing that it can
only be within a given range. Then, lint automatically
analyzes the source codes and prompts potential viola-
tions. This can be extended to support inspections of
RPC interfaces, allowing developers to explicitly declare
the constraints for each RPC input parameter. This way,
many potential bugs can be eliminated during the devel-
opment phase. This defense is practical and comprehen-
sive but requires system developers to specify the meta-
data tags for each RPC interface.
We can also conduct precautionary testing during run-
time after the ROM has been built. Our system, Binder-
Cracker, itself is effective in identifying vulnerabilities
and can be used as an automatic testing tool. By fuzzing
various system services with different policies, a large
number of vulnerabilities can be eliminated before reach-
ing the end-users. Actually, many severe vulnerabili-
ties [6, 7, 27] could have been avoided if BinderCracker
had been deployed. Note that the effectiveness of Binder-
Cracker depends on the quality and coverage of the seed
transactions. Besides collecting execution traces of a
large number of apps, another potential way of gener-
ating a comprehensive seed dataset is to incorporate the
functional unit tests of each system service.
7.2 Runtime Defense
It will be helpful if Android can provide some real-time
defense against potential vulnerabilities even after the
ROM has been deployed on end-users’ devices. Here,
we focus on specific defenses on the Binder layer, ex-
cluding generic defenses such as Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR), SELinux, etc. They have been
extensively discussed in other literature [20, 31, 33] and
are not specific to our scenario. There are two poten-
tial defenses one can provide on the Binder surface dur-
ing runtime: (i) intrusion detection/prevention, identify-
ing and rejecting transactions that are malicious, and (ii)
intrusion diagnostics, making an attack visible after the
transaction has already caused some damage.
To provide runtime intrusion prevention, one needs to
perform some type of abnormality detection on incom-
ing transactions. This works by examining the input pa-
rameters of valid/invalid RPC invocations and character-
izing the rules or boundaries. However, in our case, it
is not practical for the following reasons. First, Binder
transactions occur at a very high frequency but a mo-
bile device is itself constrained in energy and compu-
tation power. Second, parameters in Binder transac-
tions are very diverse, codependent, and evolving dy-
namically during runtime, and hence clear boundaries or
rules may not exist. Third, end-users are not likely to
endure even the smallest false-positive rate. One can,
of course, build a very conservative blacklist-based sys-
tem and hard-coding rules of each potential vulnerability
in the database. However, this seems unnecessary, espe-
cially when Android nowadays supports directly pushing
security updates (patches) to devices of end-users.
An alternative solution is to diagnose, instead of pre-
vent. It would be helpful if we can provide more visi-
bility of how malicious transactions actually undermine
a device. Even though this cannot stop the single de-
vice from being attacked, we can still utilize the collected
statistics to develop in-time security patches, benefiting
the vast majority of end-users. According to our expe-
rience in bug-hunting process (in Section 6), improve-
ments on the following two aspects can effectively in-
crease the visibility of Binder transactions.
Construct IPC Graph. In the case of an attack on the
Binder interface, the victim is the recipient of the trans-
action while the attacker is the sender. Under most cir-
cumstances, there will only be visible consequences (i.e.,
crashes) on the server side while the attacker stays in the
mist. This makes it difficult to conduct attack attribution,
especially when an attack is mounted via a chain of trans-
actions across multiple processes. To enhance the visi-
bility of attacks in this process, we can instrument each
system service to maintain the senders of recent trans-
actions. Each transaction represents an edge in the IPC
graph, linking apps and system services. Any user-level
app that is linkable to the victim system service is a po-
tential initiator of the attack. Similar techniques have
been proven to be effective in improving the visibility of
remote systems [8].
Maintain Transaction Schema. Even if we know
which transaction causes a crash, it is often challeng-
ing to identify the corresponding vulnerability, especially
when the bug is non-trivial. The most frequent obstacle
is lack of visibility of the transaction schema. A transac-
tion contains only raw bytes and may be unmarshalled in
any arbitrary way. It is extremely tedious to anatomize a
transaction and verify that it actually contains an invalid
parameter causing a specific vulnerability. We propose
to maintain transaction schema at runtime when the sys-
tem service parses a transaction (similar to Fig. 6). If the
server experiences some exception, the recorded schema
will be attached with the crash report to provide more
informative feedback.
8 Discussion
Our work has lasting values beyond the vulnerabilities
we presented in this paper. First, we comprehensively
assessed a risky attack surface that has long been over-
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looked by the system developers of Android. As our ex-
perimental results demonstrated, new vulnerabilities are
still emerging on this attack surface and BinderCracker
can help eliminate potential vulnerabilities in future re-
leases of Android.
Second, the lessons learned can transcend to other
platforms facing similar issues, such as vehicular sys-
tems (CAN buses and ECUs), wearable devices, etc. We
highlight that, although many systems adopt a client–
server model in the design of their internal system com-
ponents, they rarely follow the security standards of a
real client–server model as in a networked environment.
In many scenarios, a component may fall into the wrong
hands and create serious security threats.
Third, our parameter-aware fuzzing is generic and not
limited to system services. In fact, it also works for ser-
vices exported by user-level apps. For example, apps like
Facebook also host service in its own process space and
export it to other apps. By performing fuzzing on this
interface, more app-level vulnerabilities are expected to
be unearthed. We didn’t discuss it here mainly because
source codes of app-level services are mostly unavail-
able. Therefore, it is difficult for us to analyze the root
causes and security implications of the identified vulner-
abilities.
For two reasons, we test each firmware in its initial
state: right after it has been flushed, without installing
third-party apps, inserting SIM cards, or connecting to
WiFi. First, we want to exclude vulnerabilities caused
by external factors that may not be reproducible. Sec-
ond, we want to rule out the possibility that our fuzzing
tests would negatively affect cellular providers or Inter-
net services, for the sake of responsible research. All
of the vulnerabilities we identified have been reported to
AOSP. Part of the vulnerabilities have been accepted and
will be patched in future versions of Android, while the
rest are still under review. In this paper, we have only
revealed details about the vulnerabilities that have been
confirmed so far.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have conducted a field study accessing
the robustness of Android system services. Specifically,
we have designed and implemented BinderCracker, an
automatic testing framework that can help expose vul-
nerable system services by fuzzing the Binder inter-
face. BinderCracker supports parameter-aware fuzzing
and identified more than 100 vulnerabilities in 6 major
versions of Android. We summarized these vulnerabil-
ities, explained their security implications and analyzed
their root causes. Based on our observation, we high-
lighted the deficiency of testing only on client-side public
APIs and advocated testing and protection at the Binder
interface — the actual security boundary. Several poten-
tial defenses as well as their practicality have been dis-
cussed to help eliminate vulnerabilities as early as possi-
ble in the development cycle.
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